As the proportion of total power supplied by renewable sources increases, it gets more costly to use reserve generation to compensate for the variability of renewables, such as solar and wind. Hence, attention has been drawn to exploiting flexibility in demand as a substitute for reserve generation. Flexibility has different attributes. In this paper, we consider loads requiring a constant power for a specified duration (within say one day), whose flexibility resides in the fact that power may be delivered at any time so long as the total duration of service is equal to the load's specified duration. We give conditions under which a variable power supply is adequate to meet these flexible loads, and describe how to allocate the power to the loads. We also characterize the additional power needed when the supply is inadequate. We study the problem of allocating the available power to loads to maximize welfare, and show that the welfare optimum can be sustained as a competitive equilibrium in a forward market in which electricity is sold as service contracts differentiated by the duration of service and power level.
compensate for the variability in supply. Several such schemes have been studied, see, for example, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . There is unlikely to be a single best scheme since loads vary in their attributes of flexibility: a load requiring a fixed quantity of energy over a fixed period with no restriction as to when and at what rate this energy is delivered is very flexible; typically, however, loads have constraints on the rates of energy consumption, power limits, interruptions, etc., that must be taken into account in the characterization of flexible loads.
Consumers may need compensation in exchange for permitting suppliers to exploit their flexible loads, and this may require economic incentives that go beyond those inherent in a real-time price for energy, for example, [10] [11] [12] [13] . New commodities or service contracts may need to be designed to elicit consumer response tailored to the attributes of renewables and flexible loads. Examples of such new electricity services include service reliability and deadline-differentiated contracts [10] , [13] .
In this paper, we consider loads that require a fixed power level for a specified duration. Their flexibility resides in the fact that the time when service is delivered is immaterial so long as the total service duration (within say one day or the next few hours) equals the load-specified duration. The supplier is free to schedule DD loads within their constraints so as to match the variability in supply. The loads are differentiated by the duration of service and the power level. We call them durationdifferentiated or DD loads. Examples of such loads include pool filters which require operation for certain number of hours each day but are flexible about the time of filtering. Other such loads are electric vehicle charging, air ventilation and other processes that can be interrupted without significant reduction in their utility.
Our objective is to study a forward market implementation of duration differentiated services and characterize the existence and efficiency of a competitive equilibrium in such markets. Although supply uncertainty is a key issue, our focus in this paper is on investigating markets for the simpler problem of deterministic supply. In order to study the market with deterministic supply, we first need to identify the sets of services that can be provided with a given power supply profile. For this purpose, we first characterize when a given power supply profile is adequate to meet a set of DD loads. We also describe an algorithm that schedules the loads when the supply is adequate and determine the additional power needed when the supply is inadequate.
To investigate the efficiency of competitive equilibria, we first find the allocation of supply among consumers that maximizes the aggregate utility of all consumers. This is referred to as the social welfare maximization problem. We then show that this welfare maximizing allocation is an equilibrium in a competitive market for DD services whose energy prices vary by service duration. We establish this result for a continuum of loads which models the situation when each load is tiny in comparison to the aggregate load (think of individual loads in the kW range and the aggregate load in the MW range.) The continuum of loads allows us to avoid bin-packing problems in load scheduling and to avoid assumptions about concavity or uniformity of utility functions of different consumers. We illustrate equilibrium contracts and prices by making additional assumptions on utility functions.
In our related work [14] , we consider a different model of flexible services called rate-constrained energy services. Moreover, [14] allows for uncertainty in supply. The supplier can use its uncertain renewable generation as well as energy purchased in day-ahead and real-time energy markets to serve its customers. The supplier has to optimize the portfolio of rateconstrained services to sell, the amount of day-ahead energy to buy and the policies for making real-time energy purchases and allocations to customers in order to maximize its expected profit. While the service model and supply assumptions of [14] could be viewed as more general than this paper, it focuses only on the supplier's problem of making market and allocation decisions in response to fixed market prices for flexible services, day-ahead and real-time energy. Thus, it does not provide a competitive equilibrium analysis or address the question of efficiency of competitive equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we investigate supply adequacy, load scheduling, and the additional power needed to make an inadequate supply adequate for a given set of loads. In Section III, we analyze a forward market for duration-differentiated srvices and show the existence of an efficient competitive equilibrium. We consider two illustrative examples of this forward market for a collection of consumers with the same utility function in Section IV. Concluding remarks and future lines of research are provided in Section V.
Notation: Boldface letters denote vectors. Time is slotted and t = 1, · · · , T denotes a time slot, with T slots equal to (say) one day. For an assertion A, 1 A or 1(A) is the indicator function that equals 1 if A is true and 0 if A is false.
II. ADEQUACY CONDITIONS
We find the conditions under which the available power profile is adequate to satisfy a set of loads. The conditions are expressed in terms of majorization relationships between supply and demand. We use the following terminology.
Consumers: There is a continuum of consumers indexed by x ∈ [0, 1]. Consumer x demands power "slice" ( (x), h(x)) representing (x) ≥ 0 kW of power for a duration of h(x) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T } slots. Interpret (x) as per capita demand, so consumers in [x, x + dx] demand (x)dx kW of power for h(x) slots. These consumers are indifferent as to when electricity is delivered so long as the duration of service is h(x) slots. (·) and h(·) are measurable functions. The terms "consumer" and "load" are used interchangeably.
Supply: The power available in slot t is p t . Reorder the time axis so that p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ · · · ≥ p T . Call the vector p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p T ) the supply profile. It is also known as the generation duration curve. When we need to refer to the power supply in the original time order we will call it the supply time profile and use the notation q = (q 1 , . . . , q T ). p is a permutation of q.
Demand: The (aggregate) demand profile is the vector
So d t is the total power demanded by loads requiring at least t slots of service. Hence,
The demand profile is also known as the demand duration curve.
A. Adequacy
Definition 1: The supply profile p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p T ) is exactly adequate for loads
Thus, A(x, t) = 1 if and only if x receives electricity in slot t;
(1) states that the available power is used up; (1) and (2) together imply that the requirement of every load is met. The next result is proved similar to the case of rateconstrained services with finitely many consumers studied in [14] .
Theorem 1: The supply profile p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p T ) is exactly adequate for loads ( (x), h(x)), x ∈ [0, 1] with the corre-
Proof: We first prove sufficiency. Since d d and d is exactly adequate for d, in order to prove sufficiency, it is enough to show that if a is exactly adequate, any profile with b a is also exactly adequate. We first recall a lemma from majorization theory.
Definition 2: Define a Robin Hood (RH) transfer on a to be an operation that: i) selects indices t, s such that a t > a s ; ii) replaces a t by a t − and a s by a s + , for any ∈ (0, a t − a s )p; iii) rearranges the new vector in a nonincreasing order.
Lemma 1 [15] : Let b a with a = b. Then, there exists a sequence of RH transfers that can be applied on a to obtain b.
It remains to prove that an RH transfer preserves exact adequacy. Let a be exactly adequate with allocation function A(x, t). By applying an RH transfer of amount from slot t to s, a new profileã is obtained.
Then, the profileã is also exactly adequate for the allocationÃ where the loads x ∈ Λ are deferred from t to s
To prove the necessity, note that if the allocation A(x, t) satisfies (2), then it must be true that for s ≥ 1
Multiply (6) by (x) on both sides, integrate, and sum
where we used (1) and the definition of d t in (7) . For s = 1, the inequalities in (6) and (7) become equalities. The inequalities in our definition of majorization are reversed from standard usage to allow us to read the adequacy condition d p as demand being "less than" supply. It is worth noting that (7) gives the adequacy condition in terms of the "tail" energy in the demand and supply profiles:
Corollary 1: The condition for adequacy p d can be written as
Corollary 2: Suppose p = (p 1 , . . . , p T ), with p t = E/T constant and total energy E. Let d = (d 1 , . . . , d T ) be any demand profile requiring total energy p t = E. Then, p is adequate for d.
Proof:
which is a contradiction. Remark 1: Corollary 2 provides a simple illustration of how demand flexibility can substitute for reserve capacity. As above, suppose ( (x), h(x)) is the flexible demand of consumer x ∈ [0, 1], leading to the demand profile (d 1 , . . . , d T ) with total energy demand E = d t . By Corollary 2, this demand can be met by the constant supply profile p t = E/T . Now suppose that consumers are required to express their demand for each slot in a day or T slot-ahead market. Then, x's demand will be of the form (x) kW for slots t ∈ H(x), where H(x) = {t 1 , · · · , t h(x) } comprises the h(x) distinct slots that x has selected. In this day-ahead market, the aggregate demand for slot t will be
To meet this demand, the supplier will need generation with average power p av = E/T but which can also supply the peak demand p peak = max t δ t . The ratio
is a measure of the reserve capacity that is needed to meet this day-ahead demand. If, however, the supplier can exploit the demand flexibility, R = 0 and no reserve capacity would be needed.
B. Simple Adequacy
A less strict notion of adequacy is also useful. Definition 3: The supply profile p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p T ) is simply adequate for loads
From (10) and (11) it follows that:
so the total available energy supply exceeds the total energy required by the loads. Simple adequacy can also be stated in terms of the tail energy. 
C. Allocation
Suppose p is simply adequate for d. Let q = (q 1 , . . . , q T ) be the supply time profile. So q is a permutation of p. The following theorem describes a (causal) allocation algorithm.
Let q be the supply-time profile corresponding to p 1 Construct the allocation A(x, t) as follows:
The allocation A satisfies all of the demands.
Proof: See the Appendix. Remark 2: We call this allocation the longest leftover duration first (LLDF) rule because at each slot t, it gives higher priority to loads with a longer leftover duration
A(x, s). q is the supply-time profile; this rule is online. Before slot 1, the supplier must know the load requirements ( (x), h(x)), x ∈ [0, 1], but then before slot t, the supplier only needs to know the current supply q t to decide which loads to schedule for slot t. If the supply is adequate, all loads will be served. If the supply is not adequate, additional power must be procured, as discussed next.
D. Additional Power Procurement
If the supply profile p is not adequate, then the supplier may have to purchase an additional supply profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a T ) in order to serve the loads. With a linear cost for additional power, the power to be purchased at minimum cost while ensuring that all demands are met, is given by the solution of the following optimization problem:
where c ≥ 0 is the unit price of additional power. Note that p + a is simply adequate for d if the associated supply profile (that is, the nonincreasing rearrangement of p + a) satisfies the linear inequalities of Theorem 2. The minimum value of this optimization problem and an algorithm for finding the minimizing vector a have been provided in [14] .
III. MARKET IMPLEMENTATION
We investigate a forward market for duration-differentiated energy services in which all market transactions are completed at time 0, before slot 1. For the moment, we do not consider any uncertainty. The market has three elements:
• Services: The services ( , h) are differentiated by the number h of time slots during which kW is delivered.
There is no convexity assumption on U . The net benefit to consumer x is U (x, , h) − π h × . • Supplier: The (aggregate) supplier knows the supply profile p = (p 1 , . . . , p T ) at time 0. We first formulate the social welfare maximization problem and then show that the optimum allocation is sustained as a competitive equilibrium.
A. Social Welfare Problem
For a given supply profile p = (p 1 , . . . , p T ), we say that an allocation x → ( (x), h(x)) is feasible if p is simply adequate for the associated demand profile. By Theorem 2, the social welfare optimization problem is
subject to
Then
Thus, z 0 (1) is the value of the objective function and z t (1) ≤ T i=t p i , t = 1, 2, . . . , T are the constraints of the welfare maximization problem.
For
x → F (x) ⊂ R 1+T is a set-valued function. The differential (15) and (16) can be written as the differential inclusioṅ
The integral of the set-valued function F (x) is the set
Theorem 4: G is convex and closed. Proof: By [16, Theor. 1], G is convex, and by [16, Theor. 4] , G is compact if F (x) is closed for each x, and F (·) is bounded by an integrable function. Fix x and let n , h n be a sequence such that the sequence (U (x, n , h n ), n h n , . . . , n [h n + 1 − T ] + ) converges. Since the h n takes values in {1, . . . , T }, by taking a subsequence if necessary, we may suppose that h n → h and n → . Since U is continuous, we must have u = U (x, , h), so F (x) is closed. Since U, , h are allbounded, F (·) is bounded by an integrable function.
Observe that
The welfare maximization problem restated in terms of G is
Theorem 5: The welfare maximization problem has a solution.
Proof: The set of z(1) satisfying (20) and (21) is compact and convex. So the optimum z * (1) exists.
Theorem 5 is a consequence of assuming a continuum of users. Similar results are available, for example, in the study of an economy with a continuum of traders [17] .
Remark 3: In standard commodity markets, one often considers concave utility functions to reflect a decreasing marginal utility of consumption. In the case of duration-differentiated loads, the concave case is illustrated by the decreasing marginal utility of the number of hours a pool filter is used or a room is cooled. However, if a consumer only wants a minimum number of hours of pool filtering or air cooling, the resulting utility function is U (x, , h) = 1[ ≥ 0 , h ≥ h 0 ], which is not concave.
B. Competitive Equilibrium Analysis
We study a competitive equilibrium for the market for duration-differentiated services. Recall the definition of a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 4:
For the duration-differentiated services market, a competitive equilibrium is characterized by • a set of prices: for h = 1, 2, . . . , T , π h denotes the price per kilowatt of service of duration h; • consumer allocation: ( (x), h(x)), x ∈ [0, 1] specifies the power level and duration for each consumer; • production bundle: for h = 1, 2, . . . , T , L h denotes the total kilowatts of h duration service produced by the supplier. which satisfy the following three conditions: 1) Consumer allocations maximize their welfare at the market prices, that is
2) Supplier's production bundle maximizes its revenue at the market prices. The supplier can use the supply profile p to offer any bundle of services {L h }, h = 1, . . . , T as long as the bundle is feasible, that is, if δ i := T s=iL s is the demand profile associated with the bundle of services
The equilibrium production bundle should achieve the maximum revenue among all feasible production bundles, that is, {L h }, h = 1, . . . , T, is a solution of the maximization problem below
The market clears, that is, the total kilowatts of h duration service produced by the supplier matches the total kilowatts of h duration service demanded by consumers. In other words, the following equation holds for h = 1, 2, . . . , T :
A competitive equilibrium is called efficient if the consumer allocation at the equilibrium maximizes social welfare. Theorem 6: There exists an efficient competitive equilibrium in a forward market for duration-differentiated services.
Proof: Dualizing the social welfare problem with respect to (20) implies that there exist non-negative numbers λ 1 , . . . λ T such that the optimum z * (1) maximizes
and satisfies the complementary slackness conditions
Given the Lagrange multipliers λ 1 , . . . , λ T , the term being maximized in (24) can be written as
In order to maximize the value of the integral in (26)
(27) Interpreting the quantity T t=1 λ t [h + 1 − t] + per kilowatt price π h for duration h, (27) amounts to the consumer welfare maximization condition of equilibrium.
In order to prove that π h = T t=1 λ t [h + 1 − t] + are indeed equilibrium prices, we need to show that the supplier revenue maximization at these prices will result in market clearing.
The total revenue of the supplier can be written as
where δ k = t≥k L t . Further, using the expression for π k , (28) can be written as
(29) where we used the constraints from supplier's optimization problem in (29). Because zx * (1) satisfies the complementary slackness conditions (25), the revenue in (29) is bounded from above by
It is easy to verify that this upper bound on revenue is achieved by
Thus, the supplier's revenue maximization results in the correct bundle of services needed to clear the market.
Remark 4: It follows from the definition of prices π h = T t=1 λ t [h + 1 − t] + that π h is nondecreasing in h with nondecreasing increments. In particular
This reflects the fact that it is more difficult to provide a service of duration h 1 + h 2 than two services of duration h 1 and h 2 . This may induce consumers to install devices, for example, storage, that can bridge the service interruptions caused by purchasing two services of durations h 1 and h 2 rather than a single service of duration h 1 + h 2 .
Theorems 5 and 6 provide the general existence result about a solution to the social welfare problem and an efficient competitive equilibrium. The main consequence is the fact that even for very general utility functions, these problems admit a solution. These theoretical results provide support for finding solutions to the optimization problems, for example, through numerical algorithms. In addition, from a market perspective, the existence result provides support for price discovery through some iterative procedure [18] .
Remark 5: Define
Since the total supply in slot t is s t = T i=t p i , we see that μ * , s = μ * , p . μ t can be viewed as the per kilowatt price of each time slot. Suppose the supply time profile q is the permutation of p given by q t(i) = p i . Then, q t(1) ≥ · · · ≥ q t(T ) . So μ 1 is the per kilowatt price in slot t (1) where the supply is largest, μ 2 is the price in slot t (2) where the supply is second largest, and so on. As expected, (30) implies μ 1 ≤ μ 2 · · · ≤ μ T .
Remark 6: Suppose consumers classified some consumption as DD load requiring h slots during a period of T slots, allowing the supplier to select the h slots. These customers are similar to very reliable demand-response subscribers. Instead of being paid for reducing their consumption in response to a "demand response" event, they would get a discount for a DD load.
Remark 7: In our formulation, the supply side represents an aggregation of many suppliers. Individual suppliers may benefit by pooling their supplies to offer longer service contracts and take advantage of higher prices. Thus, we are assuming that suppliers are able to identify and exploit all such opportunities. We implicitly assume that even with such coordination, the number of effective suppliers is large enough to justify the assumption of a competitive market.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
In this section, we construct the equilibrium contracts and prices when all consumers have the same utility function U ( , h) with U ( , h) = 0 if either = 0 or h = 0. We consider two cases motivated by type of loads of interest in electricity markets. In standard commodity markets, the usual setting is to consider concave utility functions which reflects the decreasing marginal utility of many goods. Therefore, we first consider utility functions that are concave in . However, we assume that the utility function has nondecreasing strictly positive increments in h to represent situations in which interruptions of the consumption are undesirable. Thus, h = 2 provides more than twice the utility if h = 1. Examples include industrial mining processes, power supply for computational applications, air flow in hospitals. In the second case, we assume that the utility function has nonincreasing increments in h to model the situation where additional hours of consumption does not increase the marginal utility, as in the case of filtering of a pool beyond the minimum numbers of hours.
A. U ( , h) is Strictly Concave in for all h > 0 and has Nondecreasing, Strictly Positive Increments in h for all > 0
Since consumers are identical, in equilibrium they must receive the same net benefit or consumer surplus H, though not necessarily the same allocation. The equilibrium prices and allocations λ * , * , h * are parameterized by H. The approach is similar to that in [10] . Unlike [10] , our utility functions need not be linear in either of the two arguments. The consumer surplus from a service contract ( , h) with price π is
The maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a duration h service while receiving surplus H is in (32), shown at the bottom of the page, while the associated power demand is → w( , h, π) is increasing in h. So, for a fixed H, π(h, H) is defined on a set of the form T ≥ h ≥ h min (H). h min (H) is the smallest duration at which a consumer can receive surplus H.
We obtain some structural characteristics of the willingness to pay π(h, H).
Lemma 2: (1) π(h, H) is strictly increasing in h for h ≥ h min (H) and has nondecreasing increments. (2) for H ≤ H max (h), π(h, H) is strictly decreasing in H and (h, H) is strictly increasing in H.
Proof: 1) Since U ( , h) is strictly increasing in h, the willingness to pay is also strictly increasing in h. From (31) and (33) it follows that at * = (h, H)
So
Also, for any > 0, π = (U ( , h) − H)/ gives a surplus of H. Therefore, it follows that:
Using (36) and the nondecreasing increment property of the utility function, we have which implies π(h, H) has nondecreasing increments. 2) From (36), it follows that π(h, H) is strictly decreasing in H.
Since U is strictly concave in , (∂U/∂) ( , H) is strictly decreasing in , and since π(h, H) is strictly decreasing in H, (h, H) is strictly increasing in H. We now present a scheme to construct the equilibrium. Suppose the available power supply profile is p 1 ≥ p 2 · · · ≥ p T .
Step 1) Pick a trial equilibrium consumer surplus H. Use (32), (33) to construct (T − h min + 1) different contracts ( (hH), h) of duration h = T, . . . , h min , at price π(h, H).
Step 2) Assign contract ( (T, H), T ) to a group of consumers of size n(T ) = p T / (T, H). Each of these consumers will receive (T, H)kW for the T slots T, . . . , 1.
Assign contract ( ((T − 1), H), T − 1) to a (disjoint) group of consumers of size n(T − 1) = [p T −1 − p T ]/ (T − 1, H). Each of these consumers will receive (T − 1, H) kW for the (T − 1) slots (T − 1), . . . , 1.
Proceed in this way to assign the last contract ( (h min , H) to a (disjoint) group of consumers n(h min ) = [p h min −1 − p h min ]/ (h min , H).
Step 3) This allocation serves N (H) = n(T ) + · · · + n(h min ) consumers. If N (H) = 1, all consumers are served and this is the equilibrium allocation. 2 If N (H) > 1(< 1), one must increase (decrease) H and return to Step 1. From Lemma 2, we know that ∂N (H)/∂(H) is strictly negative, so there is a unique H * with N (H * ) = 1. The above allocation is illustrated in the left plot of Fig. 1 . There are five contracts of duration h = 5, . . . , 1 and
consumers. The equilibrium surplus H is determined by the market-clearing condition: N (H) = n(5) + · · · + n(1) = 1.
B. U ( , h) is Strictly Convex in for all h > 0 and has
Nonincreasing Increments in h for all > 0
We relax the social welfare problem by keeping only the total energy as constraint
Consider any ( (x), h(x)) and set E(x) = (x)h(x). Since U ( , h) is strictly convex in and has nonincreasing increments in h
Thus, the optimal allocation of the relaxed problem will have h(x) = 1. It is straightforward to show that the solution of the relaxed problem is feasible for the original problem. Consequently, in this case, the market outcome favors contracts of shorter duration by reflecting the nonincreasing increments on the utility function for h, so shorter contracts are more valuable. The allocation is illustrated by considering a power supply with five levels as in the right plot of Fig. 1 . Remark 8: In Section IV-A, for the same power level, the marginal price of the hth slot, π(h) − π(h − 1) is increasing. This is due to the fact that from a given supply profile, it may be possible to produce a m-slot and a k-slot service but not a (m + k)-slot service, as can be seen from the definition of adequacy. This contrasts with the assumption in [19] that, for conventional generator technology, the marginal price of producing electricity for duration h decreases with h. In Section IV-B, this issue does not arise since service of a single duration is produced.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of flexible loads to shape demand in response to supply variation can be an effective alternative to greater reserves to integrate renewable sources. In this paper, we focus on a stylized model of a continuum of flexible loads, each requiring a constant power level for a specified duration within an operational period. The flexibility resides in the fact that the power delivery may occur at any subset of the total period. A key characteristic of flexible loads is the fact that many supply profiles can effectively provide a set of these loads. A complete characterization of supply adequacy conditions and an algorithm for allocating supply to meet these loads in an efficient way were developed. A forward market for these loads was also investigated. The centralized solution that maximizes social welfare along with the characterization of an efficient competitive equilibrium were presented. In this paper, we assume that the supply time profile q is a fixed deterministic vector. Although supply uncertainty is a key challenge, we believe the results presented here would be useful for studying the allocation and market problems with uncertain supply. For example, one could start with a conservative estimate of the supply time profile and use our results to provide estimates of the amount of additional power needed to serve a given set of loads. Similarly, the deterministic analysis for several realizations of a stochastic supply can help in calculating the expected amount or probability distribution of additional power needed. The supplier may then use this information to make power purchases in forward or real-time energy markets. The implementation of differentiated services markets with stochastic supply and the corresponding competitive market analysis warrants further development of the deterministic results presented here. In addition, the consideration of additional load flexibility constraints, the impact of distribution system constraints and the practical implementation of duration-differentiated (and other flexible demand) markets need further study. It would also be worthwhile to compare forward market for differentiated services with standard spot markets for electricity. B(·, ·) is
Let A 1 be the set of consumers being served under the LLDF allocation at time 1.
For any set A, μ(A) := A (x)dx. 3 It is easy to verify that μ(A 1 ) = min (q 1 , μ ([0, 1])) (43) and that μ(B 1 ) ≤ μ(A 1 ). 1) Consider first the case where μ(A 1 ) = μ(B 1 ). Define C = A 1 \ B 1 and D = B 1 \ A 1 . We must have: μ(C) = μ(D). Suppose μ(C) = μ(D) > 0. Then, because P S from a partition of the set of consumers, we can write
We will refer to the sets C ∩ P S as the "atoms" of C and the sets D ∩ P S as "atoms" of D.
Because μ(C) = μ(D) > 0, there must exist sets S, U ⊂ {1, . . . , T } such that μ(C ∩ P S ) > 0 and μ(D ∩ P U ) > 0. We need to consider two possibilities: 1) μ(C ∩ P S ) ≥ μ(D ∩ P U ). Find a set C ⊂ C ∩ P S such that μ(C ) = μ(D ∩ P U ). Let D = D ∩ P U . The basic idea now is to "swap" C and D . Every consumer in C has a longer leftover duration than every consumer in D . Further, all consumers in C are always served together and all consumers in D are always served together. Therefore, there must be a time slot k at which the set C is being served under allocation rule B(·, ·) but D is not. Define the swapped allocation B (·, ·) as being identical to B(·, ·) except that B (C , 1) = 1, B (C, k) = 0 B (D , k) = 1, B (D , 1) = 0.
It is clear that this operation preserves adequacy. 2) μ(C ∩ P S ) < μ(D ∩ P U ). In this case, let C = C ∩ P S and find a set D ⊂ D with μ(D ) = μ(C ∩ P S ).
Repeat the swap as above.
In either of the above cases, after the swap is complete, we have either removed one "atom" of C or one atom of D. That is, if B is the set of consumers being served at time 1 after the swap, then either A \ B or B \ A has one less atom (of positive measure under μ) than its preswap counterpart. Since there are only finitely many such atoms, a finite number of swaps would would transform B 1 to a set that is almost surely identical to A 1 (with respect to the μ measure). Thus, we have constructed an allocation that agrees (μ almost surely) with LLDF at time 1.
2) In case μ(B 1 ) < μ(A 1 ), first find a subset E of A 1 \ B 1 with μ(E) = μ(A 1 ) − μ(B 1 ). Change B 1 to B 1 ∪ E and then use the same argument as above. The argument for future time slots is similar.
